Secondly, the Russian party could not have had a political interest in the incident, on the contrary. The thing is, that a four-party meeting on the settlement of the Georgian – South Ossetian conflict is set to take place soon. At this meeting, Moscow and Tskhinvali expect to obtain consent for international monitoring of the Roksky tunnel, the stumbling block in relations between South Ossetia and Georgia. The meeting will take place in any political weather conditions. Obviously, Russia does not need any substantial proof of its aggressiveness. But Georgia’s probable rejection of the request on the Roksky customs can be easily attributed to the treachery of Moscow, which not only blocks Georgia’s federalization, but also uses weapons against it. This is enough for Tbilisi to benefit from international PR created by the missile incident.
Thirdly, even a hypothetic bombardment of a military target in Georgia (a mobile radar system in this case) is of no military importance. Let’s repeat once again: monitoring of the airspace of both North and South Ossetia is much better ensured by the means of the recently modernized international airport in Tbilisi. The fact that the incident involves a means targeting a radar looks like a hint of a combat task. However, its organization required different efforts, from terrain reconnaissance to checking of the results. None of the local air force commanders (to say nothing of pilots) would engage in such an adventure on their own; an order from the above would be inexplicable due to clear international consequences. Is there any sense in wasting fuel, if this and any other object in the conflict zone can be taken out by a “mistake” on the part of the South Ossetian forces conducting an exercise and blamed on a senior sergeant commanding the militia troops?
My fourth point requires some extensive dwelling. There is a strictly regulated system for investigating such incidents. It is based on three major principles. The first one is the shutdown of the scene of events in order to prevent its access by non-professionals. If those who found an object presumably thrown off from an airplane supposed that it could be explosive and Russian-made, it would be logical to immediately call in Russian field engineers, who are within a 30 minutes’ drive from the scene, this being the zone of the peacekeeping operation. It is also logical to watch them work from a safe distance: obviously, an explosive object deformed after fall should be better handled by those to whom it belongs. Why would Georgians risk, if they assure that they do not have such ammunition? However, instead of Russian engineers, the Georgian president arrived at the scene. Is he, perhaps, immortal and therefore unafraid of explosions?
The second principle is involvement of all interested parties. In this case, there are two of them. It is clear to everyone that a unilateral investigation or two parallel ones will not yield the same result. Why conducting it then, especially involving Lithuanians and Estonians that have nothing to do with it? Or do they? Or do they have some secret knowledge? (No, really, what if?..) Moreover, field expertise does not have to produce any conclusions, only a detailed protocol of debris and witnesses’ testimonials. All this has a legal effect only if signed by both parties. Haven’t Georgians, who once in a month complain of interventions in their sky or on their territory, learned as much? Moreover, the legally accepted identifier of a disputed object is the presence of a number or other marking on it that is similarly interpreted as its belonging to a specific owner. How can we then explain the fact that the number, unlike the QCD stamp, has not been produced?
The third principle is strict separation of functions of investigators and, consequently, political conclusions’ dependence on expert opinion. When an investigation seeks to establish the truth, roles are divided as follows: field workers collect evidence, experts offer different possible scenarios, and their chiefs coordinate an “invariable” version. Only after that, political leaders weigh all the pros and cons and come up with the final “diagnosis.” In this case, however, a Georgian expert took off a couple of screws from the part of the missile that had not been destroyed fully and established: there had been two planes that had flown in from Mozdok. And the UN received Tbilisi’s verdict even before Russian experts had arrived at the scene.
Finally, allegations of the Soviet-Russian origin of the missile’s parts are the kind of arguments meant for housewives. There are more such weapons than any other in the former countries of the Warsaw Pact. Georgians, however, although usually complaining of the mess with the Soviet military and technical legacy, stated with certainty that they did not have such missiles…
A non-professional in missile and aircraft issues has nothing more to add. As an analyst, I would point to the tough statement made by Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov: had there been any doubts, he would have hardly staked his reputation on the shaky Georgian issue, being one of the most likely candidates for presidency. And the last and exclusive: interaction with the Georgian party leaves a feeling that our partners are too emotional at the expense of diplomatic traditions and sometimes even common ethics. I recall a dialog heard in the Tavrichesky palace, the residence of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. “If you want South Ossetia, then give us Chechnya.” “Does Georgia have any claims towards it?” “No, but it will be fair.” Can there be search for the truth with such an ideological background?
I have written on another, no less sensitive issue – the case of Litvinenko and Lugovoi – that any investigation is conducted pursuing one of two goals, to find the truth or to have it out with somebody. In both of our cases, “having it out” has a political aspect to it. This is at least not contradicted by the contents of the Russian-Georgian dialog, nor the place where the missile or its dummy was found.
Boris POdoprigora, military analyst, member of the Expert Analytical Council under the Russian Parliament’s committee for the CIS and compatriots’ affairs.
