Expiring year 2007 could be hardly called successful for the US Missile Defense Agency. It cannot report to the US President, legislators and taxpayers on complete fulfillment of its plans of the year. It is explained by several factors – talks with Czechia and Poland on deployment of ABM Defense elements are still in progress although they are expected to be already completed; American scientific community severely criticized the plans to deploy the ABM Defense in Europe reinforcing its position with scientifically grounded arguments of anti-Russia thrust of such step; US Congress urged to conduct an independent expert examination of the plans to deploy the ABM Defense in Europe.

Besides, the US Congressmen want to receive from the Pentagon evidence that the facilities to be deployed in Europe are effective. But the Pentagon fails.

And it is in spite of the fact that every more of less successful test of the US ABM Defense elements is publicized by the US military authorities as an utmost success in development of an absolutely reliable ballistic missile killing technology.

The effectiveness of interceptors is determined by their capability to intercept ballistic missiles in real conditions of their combat use. The claimed effectiveness may be confirmed only by the results of comprehensive ABM system interceptor flight tests to kill live targets in severe environment (interference, decoy targets, etc.).

And what is an actual picture? The USA started developing its missile interceptors (Ground-Based Interceptors – GBI) in the early 90-s (when such works were banned by the running ABM Treaty of 1972!). The first test launch was conducted in June 1997 and widely advertised. It seemed to the Americans and their allies that they need to take one-two steps more and they will get an absolute defense against any ballistic missile attack. But the realty fell short of their expectations.

Since 1997, the USA made more than a dozen of GBI tests. A half of them was officially recognized failed due to GBI course drift, off-nominal thrust vector control, failed breakup of an interceptor stage, etc. Another half of the tests (“successful”) cannot confirm the GBI effectiveness due to the “hothouse” conditions of these tests. The GBI were passively guided to the target-missile beacon, target-missile flight parameters were transmitted to the GBIs prior to the lunch, and target-missile flight parameters received by the guidance radar were not used to guide the interceptors.

It is rather doubtful that Iran, North Korea or any other country will mount radio beacons on their BMs and advise the Americans on their planned flight parameters to let the Americans kill these BMs easier. Insufficient technological status of the interceptors is confirmed by the fact that during almost four years (from October 2002 until September 2006) the USA failed to perform at least one successful GBI flight test to intercept a target missile.

The GBI flight test conducted this September also does not make it possible to draw a conclusion that the Americans came closer to the claimed effectiveness of their interceptors. Firstly, this test was delayed twice (from December 2006 to May 2007 and from May to September 2007); secondly, the test conditions were also simplified – target-missile flight parameters were loaded in the GBI in advance, and the target was not provided with ABM defense penetration aids. It is evident that such tests are performed not to prove reliability and effectiveness of the future US ABM Defense system but to justify huge amounts invested in this system. The conducted test cannot confirm effectiveness and technical availability of the GBIs to be deployed in Poland. The point is that as it was officially claimed by the Americans, instead of three-stage GBIs that are loaded in silos in Alaska and Vandenberg, the silos in Poland are expected to be loaded with new two-stage GBIs. What effectiveness could be spoken about if these new GBIs have never been tested yet moreover they are still at the design documentation stage.

The GBI Project features a high risk, and it is one of the most expensive components of the entire US ABM Defense Programme. Actual capabilities of the interceptor to kill various targets have not been demonstrated for far.

The American legislators also become skeptical about the effectiveness of the GBIs being made and about the need to spend such significant budgetary funds on their development. It is quite logical if the results of the tests in the last ten years are judged rationally.

In spite of all doubtful conclusions on the conducted GBI tests, critics by the scientific community and doubts of certain Congressmen about the urgency to deploy such “raw” ABM defense system, the Pentagon endeavors to start the deployment of the ABM Defense in Europe as soon as possible. Such rush is explained by one reason only – for the Washington Administration it is very important to get a site for its strategic forces outside the US territory closer to the Russian borders.

"Having anchored” in Europe the USA in future would be in position to augment its strategic potential by any means that do not exclude loading missiles of other types, offensive missiles, in these silos. This option is not excluded, moreover at high-ranking talks in the “2+2” format the Americans do everything to avoid any obligations relating to non-expansion of their strategic force capabilities in Europe.