“Political Hour” of Truth
To start with let’s imagine …. A Russia-NATO plane that took off from airbase Partnership fifteen years ago still failed to reach the point of no return. If it reached this point, it would mean that the plane should fly only forwards because there would be no fuel to return. But our plane just circles about midway to “Rubicon” wasting its fuel and risking to land on a geopolitically unfamiliar terrain. Each of the sides bears its own risk. Thus the civilization fracture between our aspirations to upswing and Western efforts to consolidate the reached objectives is widening. It reminds in something the recent definition of the general collision of the epoch.
The West offers an option to us: either you accept the dictate of NATO maintaining the external similarity of a dialogue, or you face confrontation. In the later case, the leaders of the Alliance massively acting upon us finally may encroach not only on the Great Patriotic Stabilization Fund but on the quality of the domestic statehood. But on the other hand, the West will inevitably reduce its aggregate potential even dumping us to the geopolitical residue. Thus it will provoke its collision with still ruminating Chinese and Islamic “worlds”, which are more passionaric (fiery) and less vulnerable than us. The paradox is that maintaining our globally balancing role is more advantageous to the West than doing away with Russia. Moreover, no half-measures are sufficient with respect to Russia, which so many times confirmed its historical reputation of a survivor.
Does the West comprehend it? By logic- yes it does. But temptation to reach another geopolitical objective (while the going is good) has been cultivated by the euphoria of triumph of the late 90s. In a different scale but similarly, in the 80s of the same century we were going to keep Afghanistan just as we consolidate our control over the Panjsher and around Kandahar. Surely, we may complain that we failed to get the West interested in nontrivial prospects of the strategic partnership. But let’s have it straight, this partnership could not exist to address an aggression of aliens from a hostile galaxy or Hollywood-made “revolt of machines”. A real vis-à-vis of the West is China. But we have much more good ties with this country than with Old and New Worlds. At the same time, the war on terror in fact was reduced to justification of the Western military presence in the Middle East. This is a preamble to the third phase of the NATO expansion, which still remains pending.
The acuteness of this problem was predetermined, firstly, by dichotomy of the situation (yes or no) with a multiversion approach to solution of two other problems holding out a hope for a compromise: ABM system deployment and struggle for “quotes” under the CFE Treaty. Secondly, it was predetermined by the fact that membership of Ukraine and Georgia in the Alliance will entail probably the most radical and expensive upgrade of the national defense in the history of Russia. This upgrade will be caused not only by the fact that such key military-agreement definitions as “balance of forces” or “time of arrival” become senseless, and not only by the risk of “non-remote control” of the situation in the Caucasus but first of all by absolutely uncompensated vulnerability of the Russian centers of power. The comparisons of potentials routinely used in analyses will hardly add much to the picture.
Public declarations of the NATO aspirants on non-deployment of foreign military bases in their territories likewise their promises to become a notorious “bridge” are legally and practically null and void. According to the NATO regulations, the military activities of the Alliance are mandatory to all its members. A weapon, which is posted in the study room only for decoration according to its master, is still a weapon. And if the Alliance reaches the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range-Rostov-Voronezh line it would be easier to move the capital to deeper Russia than to negotiate prevention of the temptation. The value of the mater comprehended both by us and by them corresponds to “the Hour of Truth” as minimum in the contemporary history of the country.
Until Tiger Learns to Speak…
According to an orient parable, one student asked his wise master: “Why does the tiger which is stronger than the man, cede to the man in all our legends?” The wise master answered” “When the tiger learns to speak, it will tell us its own legend.” This is the deference between our and NATO “legends”. In our case, the latter is enriched with Kiev’s and Tbilisi’s “legends”. What is their essence? The stand of the aspirants is quite explainable: if the Soviet Union failed to prove its viability, it means that its vis-à-vis confirmed its exclusive vitality. So, they are looking for a union with the strongest party additionally explaining their steps by historical and mythological arguments. The key mobilizing incentive quoted from the Soviet fiction of the 30s is at the interface between the two arguments: “The West will help us!”. May be it will. But according to our “legend” it will help as much as it conforms to its plans. And the West evidently is not interested to make them such strong that it would conform also with the aspirations of Russia. Thus, any assistance of the West to its new allies will mean for us only growth of their competitive capability and even frontage against Russia. On pragmatic grounds we do not need it.
Both Kiev and Tbilisi associate their bright NATO membership future with strengthening their positions in the energy sphere. Ukraine believes that its “military copulation” with Europe would make its voice louder in its dialogue with Moscow. But price standardization today already is on the agenda on the talks between Moscow and European Union. Therefore the military-ultimatum-supported pricing looks either like a “maidan” argument in favor of NATO, or pretext for a military conflict with Russia: they will hardly reduce the gas production cost by using the Tomahawks! Georgia is already long ago became an important energy transit country for the West to bypass Russia. In this narrow sense its membership in NATO will hardly change anything both for us and for others. But the transit of NATO influence to Azerbaijan will radically change the political outline of the Caspian Sea, making this problem-safe sea a zone of military divide line between the West and East. Unfortunately “the twain” hasn’t met yet, and we do not want to have a Caspian Front.
Let arguments “More NATO – More Democracy” be chanted in the” maidan” and other propaganda grounds. Generally speaking, a military analyst does not care both of the political culture of the neighbors and of the media affecting the missile system operator. The most important is that this culture would not create problems to us and the missile itself would be located as far as possible from us. To tint the black-and-white picture we may say that we treat somebody’s “orange color” just as “violet” until it biases the palette of our own national colors.
Perhaps therefore the most demagogical argument is a reference to the exemplary Western democracy. Especially when it relates to military decisions. The Alliance made decisions on Kosovo and Iraq in accordance with the procedures, which are democratic in its opinion. The fulfillment of these decisions was broadcasted the world over in real time. What has it changed for a person kept covered? When Estonian leader Ilves educated on the values of the American democracy is provoking in public the northern Russian population into separatism, a question arises: Is it true that the absolutism corresponds better to the rules of international decorum?
In the Ukrainian and Georgian cases just a reference to a democratic choice of these nations does not cause any other sensations but disgust. As it happens it is enough to make “just only” 60 per cent of Ukrainian opponents of the Alliance change their mind, and all people will say “NATO-Yes!” It is well-known that in Georgia the NATO vote was held within the framework of the presidential election. According to the opposition, the election has been fabricated to the order with incredible number of thrown-in and withdrawn ballots. But neither opponents nor supporters of Saakashvili are doubtful in 70 per cent support of the NATO future of the country. In physical terms it is about 40 per cent of 4 million Georgian population, half of which migrate to Russia to work for money. Since the Tbilisi authorities see nothing earthshuttering in the future choice of their country, the opinion of Georgians migrated and migrating to Russia is disregarded by Saakashvili and democratic West. Therefore our “legend” strictly divides the market, the public “maidan” and the military bases.
Security Cannot Be Political Correct
The situation is a bit different with respect to the factor of Georgian and Ukrainian national sovereignty. Let’s say it straight, the role of Russia in the internal Georgian federal-separatist conflict was not perfect, yet it was not Russia that provoked the conflicts. Looking back to the early 90s we cannot find clear pre-requisites for the today’s internal Georgian integration. While the membership in NATO is regarded by Georgia as an instrument to restore its territorial integrity. In this sense the motives of a significant majority of Saakashvili’s compatriots are clear. On the other hand, it is due to Moscow, but not due to the international community or moreover Tbilisi that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been transferred from the military to political plane. And the chances for integration still exist if Georgia maintains good neighborly relations with Russia and in no case will be a NATO member. It’s another pair of shoes that this process should not be accelerated. For example, just today 34 years after the ethnic conflict in Cyprus we see the first signs of potential political reintegration there.
Experts believe that the Russian interest in stable neighborly relations with Georgia may initially lead to that model of integration between Tbilisi, Sukhum and Tzhinval, which is experienced in the multiformat models of the union between Russia and Belorussia. But Georgian membership in NATO will make such prospects far away if not block them at all - our unfriendly neighbor should have as lower potential of hostility as possible at least geographically. It is an axiom that military definition of objectives is based on spatial (i.e. temporal) characteristics, and nobody can say that the today’s choice of the Abkhaz and South Ossetia peoples is not democratic. Diplomats may express this idea in a more diplomatic way.
The situation with respect to Ukraine is more complicated. Not only Crimea, but also the entire eastern part together with the Odessa region objectively gravitates to Russia. This factor may play an opposite-directed role: it may provide for either an integration bridge with a historically fraternal nation headed by friendly leaders, or a split on indications vital for Russia. The technological aspect of the affair is not advertised by analysts but is well-known to them. It is also well-known how the Kiev authorities are going to “mutually compensate” “the passionarity” of two title communities in Crimea, and it is high time to warn about it expressly.
In short, if your neighbors preferred potential aggressiveness to friendship what do you have to do: appease it with cannibalism of your own or canalize it to internal conflicts of the neighbors? Moreover, a long-sighted party should suppress implementation of a priori unfriendly potential of its neighbors as early as possible. Because the pragmatic approach is inherent to the politics not less than to the romantic triangle if its sides do not flirt but seriously think about their future. In this case the choice of your neighbors precedes your choice.
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The recognized political incorrectness of judgments shared already by many political analysts more and more evidently conflicts with the recommendation of F.M. Tutchev. This diplomat and poet suggested in disputable cases “rely on time and circumstances”. 15 years ago we were not only weaker but also more naive.
