The Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine threatens the latter not only with economic difficulties. There may be problems with a number of areas. First of all, they include the Crimea, where by the Crimean Tatar nationalists' hands the West studiously builds the foundation for repeating the Kosovo scenario.
The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008, has stirred the Ukrainian political community, which begin to talk about the danger of the Kosovo precedent for the Crimea. Indeed, the Achilles heel of Serbia and Ukraine is the existence of seats of ethnic separatism - Kosovo and the Crimea. To a considerable degree this is a consequence of a new parallel between the two Slavic nations - their pro-European aspirations. The Serbian and Ukrainian ruling elites equally stubbornly drag their countries into the European Union, ignoring the popular majority's opinion and the countries' national interests.
Such a vector of Ukraine's and Serbia's foreign policy is predetermined by the 'democratic' influence of the West that uses in relation to the both states 'soft' and 'not very soft' force. One of the manifestations of these forces is a broad support of ethnic separatist projects allowing at 'appropriate' time to turn the potentially 'dangerously explosive' regions into real hot spots and to establish their presence there under the pretext of settlement.
In compliance with the tactics of double standards, the West periodically scares the world opinion with statements about the alleged forcible takeover of power in the Crimea by Russia, simultaneously intimidating by the presence on the peninsula of the Kremlin's 'fifth column' represented by pro-Russian organizations and militarized Cossack associations. At the same time, Brussels and Washington, without a twinge of conscience patronize the Crimean Tatar separatists in their so far non-violent struggle for the creation of a nation state in the Crimea. And in the second case, Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic 'friends' hardly care its territorial integrity. Meanwhile, the analysis of the current state of affairs in the Crimea allow to predict in the foreseeable future the occurrence of a 'Kosovo-moulded' conflict, whose instigators will be the Crimean Tatar nationalists.
A catalyst of destructive processes in the peninsula may be coming into effect of the Association Agreement with the European Union. If it is signed and ratified by the parliaments of the EU member states, Ukraine will come to be under the economic and even geopolitical control of the European Union and, therefore, NATO. Some Kiev's powers of authority will pass to the European supranational institutions that will receive leverages of direct influence on the situation in Ukraine. It is hardly to doubt that the primary task of this influence in the Crimean direction will be the replacement of the Russian presence in all spheres of life in the region, reformatting the Russian image of Crimea. In the international political aspect these efforts will look reasonable, because the associated Ukraine will be part of the zone of the European Union's political and economic control.
Within the framework of the EU's and the United States' efforts to neutralize the Russian factor in Ukraine the Black Sea Fleet will become a key target of attacks. It is not improbable that Brussels will incline Kiev to unilaterally break off the Kharkov agreements and demand from Russia the withdrawal of fleet from Sevastopol. "After 2015, Russia will begin withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine. Given the energy prospects after the signing of the Association Agreement, Ukraine will quietly denounce the Kharkov agreement, which does not meet Ukraine's national interests," said the political analyst Paul Nuss, suggesting that the Black Sea Fleet location in the Crimea is contrary to the provisions of the Association Agreement.
According to many sensible experts' concerns, it is the withdrawal of the Russian fleet that will serve as the main 'trigger' to destabilize the Crimea on the Kosovo model. There are not any Russian military bases in Serbia; there is the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea. The Crimea is part of Ukraine, and there is already absolutely non-Serbian Kosovo. And it's not that whether the Black Sea Fleet will take active steps in case of the Crimean Tatars' separatist plans implementation by force. Not intentions but capabilities the Black Sea Fleet has are of importance!
If Kiev under pressure of the European Union still gets out of Moscow the fleet withdrawal even before activating the Crimean Tatars 'button', the Sevastopol bay in due course may well be occupied by ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet, which will create the conditions for the declaration by the Crimean Tatar separatists of a nation-state, which Ukraine will have to recognize under pressure from the European Union. Are there forces in the Crimea that will resist the Kosovo scenario imposed by the Crimean Tatar extremists and their powerful patrons? If there are, to 'maintain order' on the peninsula some euro peacekeepers or an international police force will be introduced, whose impartiality is nothing to set hopes upon.
Russia may lose all moral, political and international legal pretexts to render assistance Ukraine in suppressing a probable inter-ethnic conflict in the Crimea, as it once was deftly moved away from involvement in Balkan affairs. Postulating the similarity of tragic realities in Kosovo and red flags in the Crimea, it is necessary to highlight four essential features characteristic of both problem regions.
Ethnic separatists' demographic potential
Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija have already reached the absolute ethnic predominance and on the last census in 2011 they represent 93% of the population of the self-declared republic. It was influenced mainly by two factors: High birth rates of the Albanian Kosovars and Tito's efforts to gain the Albanians over from the neighboring country in order to draw Albania into the SFRY. Demographic progress of the Crimean Tatars are, so far, more modest, but their share in the national composition of the Crimean population has already probably exceeded the level of 12% recorded by census of 2001. Since the all-union census of 1989, their number in the Crimea has increased 6.4 times and amounted to 243.4 thousand people.
As the birth rate of the Crimean Tatars is higher than that of the Slavs, their share in the national structure of the Crimea will only increase. According to some estimates, by 2040, the Crimean Tatar population will amount to 27 to 30% of the peninsula population. But if the forecast of the Crimean Tatar population sharp increase due to the high natality is somewhat exaggerated, the information about 100-150 thousand Crimean Tatars in Central Asia, many of whom have half a mind to do move to the Crimea, make the perspective of the Crimean Tatar ethnic dominance more realistic.
In any case, it follows from the above that the number of potential supporters of the Crimean Tatar ethnic separatists' project will grow.
Nationhood as an unquestionable goal
Like the Kosovo Albanians who showed a complete unanimity on the issue of self-determination on the historically Serbian land, the leading Crimean Tatar organizations, regardless of their foreign and domestic policy preferences, share the same idea. Despite the internal split in the Crimean Tatar national movement, both Milli Majlis with numerous controlled organizations and Milli Firka (in opposition to it) together with other members of the Crimean Tatar People's Front - all of them set the ultimate goal to achieve statehood.
The main documentary expression of this impulse is the Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar people, adopted by the II Qurultay in 1991 which has not yet been repealed. It clearly and unequivocally states: "Political, economic, spiritual and cultural revival of the Crimean Tatar people is possible only in its national sovereign state. The Crimean Tatar people will seek this goal with the use all the means provided by international law." And the Crimean Tatar nationalists from time to time remind of their fundamental objective to the Ukrainian authorities. In this regard, symptomatic was the main slogan of the mourning meeting of 20,000 thousands on the occasion of the 69th anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, which read: "Crimea - Ukraine colony!"
External support of the ethnic separatist movements
The story would not have known many local conflicts and wars, if they had not been fed by external forces. For example, the EU, the U.S. and NATO consistently and overwhelmingly support the struggle of the Kosovars and the regime established by force of arms in the autonomous province of Serbia. Executors of the Crimean Tatar separatist project headed by the Majlis receive significant support from these geopolitical players too. Via a dense network of various NGOs, humanitarian foundations, research centers, grants and financial aids they are feeding the Majlis financially and direct its activities in the 'right' way. Brussels and Washington are closely watching the Crimean Tatar problem. Foreign diplomats visit this illegal representative body of the Crimean Tatars more often than the Crimean republican authorities, and sometimes without condescending to the latter. Such honors are rendered the Majlis by the leading Euro-Atlantic powers not for nothing. Speaking for Ukraine's early European integration and decisively against the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, the Majlis appears as a 'Trojan Horse' of the West in the friendly to Russia Crimea.
One of the latest evidence of the Western establishment's high attention to the Crimean Tatar issue was the recent visit of European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, Stefan Fule in Simferopol for talks with representatives of the Mejlis and the Crimean official authorities. During the meeting, the European Commissioner urged the Ukrainian authorities to finally pass a M.Dzhemilev's bill on Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds, to held next year the International Forum on the restoration of the Crimean Tatar people's rights, and to take steps to prolong the Bishkek agreements and re-establish the Ukrainian government agency for addressing the problems of repatriates.
But the European official's main message to the Ukrainian government concerned the need to make efforts "to enable an open and inclusive political process", which means "the recognition and importance of pluralism in the Crimean Tatar people, the legitimacy and the key role of organizations such as the Majlis of the Crimean Tatar people." The words of the high-ranking European visitor were perceived by many as a call for legitimizing the Majlis which a month before was recommended to Kiev by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Knut Vollebaek in his report "The integration of formerly deported people in Crimea".
The uproar over the Crimean Tatar topics in the EU high offices did not cease hereon. On 26 September, at a meeting of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights a report was presented by the Head of the EU Delegation to Moldova Dirk Schubel on the situation of Crimean Tatars, in which most of the focus was on the International Forum on the restoration of the rights of Crimean Tatars. By all appearances, the concern with this issue is due to the fact that the forum under the auspices of the EU and the OSCE is to develop a 'road map' on restoring the rights of the deported, whose provisions Ukraine will have to consider. And as the Majlis and European political institutions act as 'cartographers', the forum will launch a process of the Crimeans ethnic division into the privileged and the rest.
As can be seen, the level of the Majlis support from the European Union and the U.S. gives solid reason to believe that the international recognition of the projected Crimean Tatar state will be ensured.
But a reasonable question arises: why do Europe and America need the Crimean Tatar problems? In fact, they only serve as a cover to hide the geo-strategic interests of the EU and the U.S. in relation to the entire Black Sea-Caspian region. The West's aspiration to play the 'Crimean Tatar card' on the Kosovo model acquires its meaning within the strategy of Russia containment in the south-western borders, and its forcing far into the Eurasian continent. In this vein, the emergence of a source of irritation near the North Caucasus would undermine the authority of Moscow in this troubled region, and bind its powers. In other words, creating internal problems in Russia is the best way to make it forget about the active political and economic positioning in the international arena. In addition, the European Union and the United States are interested in the Crimea as a springboard to expand their presence in the Black Sea region, which is the corridor for the energy resources transit from the Caspian Sea to Europe.
Injection of Islamism
Fomenting tension in Kosovo and the Crimea is favored by the growing influence of radical Islamic movements sponsored by the rich United States' Arab satellites. In the Crimea, the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) religious-political organization has enjoyed the widest popularity; its purpose is the construction of an Islamic caliphate on a global scale. Recognized terrorist and banned in Russia, Germany, a number of Central Asian countries and in the Middle East (total 29 countries of the world), this organization on the peninsula finds many supporters among the Crimean Tatar youth and rural residents.
Similar processes of Islamic extreme ideas introduction in the rather religiously indifferent community are taking place in Kosovo. The Kosovo 'Unite Islamic Movement (LISBA) has asserted itself loud enough; high activity was observed among the foundations al-Wah al-Islami and al-Haramain, the Student Islamic Front, the Saudi Committee for Assistance to Kosovo and Chechnya, not to mention various Wahhabi groups. The Islamists' methods of penetration and consolidation in the 'Republic of Kosovo' and in the Crimea are approximately the same: establishment of Islamic humanitarian funds, construction of mosques and Koranic schools, visits by Arab trainer missionaries, sending Muslim youth to study in madrasahs of the Arab countries, activity in the media space.
The European perspective, even if it is foggy and really advantageous only for the oligarchs of the integrating country has its effect just the same. Belgrade for the sake of 'European future' has already sacrificed the indigenously Serbian land of Kosovo and Metohija, agreeing to sign the Brussels agreement, which has in fact legislated the surrender of the land to the reigned there ethnically Albanian criminalized government.
Is it Ukraine's turn now to make a sacrifice to the European altar, and may the Crimea be such a sacrifice? Too obvious similarities with Serbia suggest the fear that the Crimea risks repeating the fate of Kosovo. Will we be able to go through the eye of a needle?
